Nicaragua:
Once again, fear
By Carlos Alberto Montaner
On Nov. 5, Nicaraguans will go to the polls. It is very likely that
Daniel Ortega, despite the rejection he provokes, will return to power 16
years after leaving it. A survey I saw placed him at the head of the voters'
preferences, with 29 percent of the popular support. He is followed by
Eduardo Montealegre, a youthful-looking liberal in the classic sense, former
banker and former minister, with 27 percent. Lawyer José Rizo, vice
president in the current government, gets 16 percent, and economist Edmundo
Jarquín, a former Sandinista returned to sanity by his experience at the
Inter-American Development Bank, gets 15 percent. Altogether, the anti-Sandinista
vote approaches 60 percent, but it's deeply divided. The percentage of
undecided votes remains high.
Runoffs are permitted in Nicaragua, but if the leading candidate garners
more than 35 percent of the votes and outdistances the runner-up by more
than 5 percent it is not necessary to repeat the contest between the two top
vote-getters. Until a couple of years ago in Nicaragua, the leading
candidate needed 45 percent of the votes to avoid a runoff, but the
Sandinistas negotiated a 10-point trim with former President Arnoldo Alemán
in exchange for forgiving him his crimes of corruption. Ortega's electoral
ceiling happened to be about 40 percent. In the three elections conducted
since 1990, he never got less than 40 percent of the votes. If the
phenomenon repeats itself, Daniel can win.
That's bad news for everyone. Although disguised as Mother Teresa and
spouting love and reconciliation, Ortega continues to be the extremist he
always was, now revitalized under the revolutionary baton of Hugo Chávez. If
he wins the election, he will join the Caracas-Havana-La Paz axis to engage
in the creation of "21st-Century socialism," as that sect calls the
ideological and anti-Western balderdash brewed after the disappearance of
the Soviet Union. That means an increase in the frictions inside Nicaragua,
inevitable conflicts with the nation's neighbors in Central America, and the
worst possible relations with Washington.
Naturally, the economic consequences of this panorama are disastrous for
Nicaraguans. Foreign investments will suddenly dry up and national capitals
will seek shelter in Miami banks to wait for better weather. The country,
which desperately needs entrepreneurs capable of generating jobs, will have
to depend on Venezuela's unreliable charity to survive. That's what is
happening with Cuba, which today receives covert subsidies totaling $2
billion or $3 billion a year from the magnanimous colonel Chávez, intent as
he is on buying the leadership of the Third World with the (temporary)
bonanza created by crude-oil prices.
Why and how did this old ghost emerged from the grave? During the decade
he held the presidency in the 1980s, Ortega was the worst leader in
Nicaraguan history. He provoked a devastating civil war and the exodus of a
million compatriots, destroyed the entrepreneurial fabric, reduced the GDP
by 40 percent, and unleashed a horrifying hyperinflation. His political
police tortured prisoners and his army committed ethnocide against the
indigenous minorities (who today accuse him at the Inter-American Court of
Justice) and the murder -- mass or selective -- of its adversaries.
As if that weren't enough, on a personal level his stepdaughter
Zoilamérica has accused him repeatedly and fruitlessly of having raped her
since she was a girl, while the entire country knows he was a boundless
thief who seized the properties of his adversaries and parceled out to his
accomplices the wealth of the nation in an orgy of corruption known as "the
piñata" after he learned in 1990 that he had lost the election. Like the
pirates, he sacked the city before leaving it.
In fact, it is almost a mystery how the political class commits suicide.
It happened in Venezuela and Bolivia, where the democratic parties,
incapable of identifying the national interests, dug their own grave and
opened the way to authoritarianism. The same could happen now in Nicaragua.
How to avoid it? In Managua, two scenarios unfold. One possibility is that
the anti-Sandinista voters, aware of the danger, renounce sectarianism and
decide to vote for the candidate with the greatest possibility of winning.
The other, more improbable, is that, one week before the elections, one
of the two other candidates on the democratic side (or both), facing certain
defeat, renounce their aspirations and back whoever can beat Ortega, to save
Nicaraguans from a new era of horror and shame. Few weeks remain for us to
see the dénouement of this drama.
October 8, 2006
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