U.S. abandons Colombia
Carlos Alberto Montaner
Colombia must
prepare to stand starkly alone. It is very likely that military aid from the
United States will vanish in the near future, as Republicans and Democrats
do battle.
President
Alvaro Uribe may be winning the war in the Colombian jungles, but he's
losing it in Washington.
It is not true
that the two U.S. parties unite patriotically when faced with major
foreign-policy challenges. That's part of the American mythology. If there's
any electoral advantage in throwing overboard a foreign ally (or supporting
him), Republicans and Democrats will do it. The only immovable principle is
that elections must be won at any cost and under any pretext.
Nor should
Colombians expect the slightest solidarity from their ''Latin American
brothers.'' That's another myth. The feelings that prevail in the region are
either indifference or satisfaction over the dangers that loom over
Colombian democracy.
The countries
in the southern cone are indifferent. Brazil -- despite the refinement of
its ruling class -- is a giant with feet of clay and a soccer ball for a
head.
The
governments of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and, of course, Cuba
are happy. Panama, which once was a Colombian province, fears the
consequences but, given its limited specific weight, can do little or
nothing.
Mexico, under
the Estrada Doctrine of ''nonintervention in the affairs of another state,''
achieved total insignificance in foreign-policy years ago and has defended
it stubbornly.
Hugo Chávez is
rubbing his hands. He has a plan, and Colombian intelligence is aware of it.
It seems he convinced the drug-trafficking, communist-leaning guerrillas to
collaborate in a strategy that will lead the so-called Democratic Pole to
victory in the next elections.
The Venezuelan
colonel is willing to spend whatever is needed: $10 million, $50 million,
$100 million. The gush of petrodollars is enough to bankroll those imperial
spasms. After the triumph in Colombia, Peru will fall of its own weight in
the next elections, maybe by the hand of Ollanta Humala -- and the conquest
of the Andean arch will be complete: 100 million people.
In sum, after
amending the views of Lenin and Fidel Castro, Chávez proposes to repeat the
Venezuelan experience in Colombia. That experience has become a universal
theory for the seizure of power: You win the elections, write a Constitution
that destroys the foundations of a republican structure and wipes out all
vestiges of individual rights, gradually silence the opposition, nationalize
the means of production and militarize the population under a deluge of
revolutionary slogans.
Then you
become part of the glorious 21st-century socialism, a guayabera-and-red-beret
version of the Soviet madhouse that was mercifully torn down last century.
Can Colombia
resist, without allies, the hurricane that approaches? It all depends on the
common sense of the democratic political class. Previous experience has not
been very encouraging.
In Venezuela,
Ecuador and Nicaragua, the democratic political class committed suicide. It
irresponsibly walked into the slaughterhouse. It chose to go blind as long
as it could poke its political rival in the eye, even though both belonged
to the same democratic family. Finally, when both were blind, the enemy of
republican values leisurely took over the presidential palace and began the
demolition.
The theory
heard most often in Colombia is optimistic. People think that ''it cannot
happen in this country.'' Why not? Supposedly because of the country's
political tradition and society's adherence to the rule of law; and because
Colombians know the meaning of a triumph by the left, with the drug-trafficking,
communist guerrillas standing in the shadows. That is why Uribe retains 70
percent of the popular support: He represents what Colombians really want.
I don't
believe that theory. Colombia, too, can fall.
In 1989,
Venezuelans gave Carlos Andrés Pérez the greatest endorsement at the polls
of any president in the nation's history. In 1991, surveys showed that he
enjoyed 70 percent of the popular support. In 1992, one day after Chávez
attempted to overthrow him by a military coup, it was learned that 65
percent of the Venezuelans sympathized with the putschist officers.
The conclusion
is obvious: Democratic values are hanging by a thread in Latin America --
and Colombia is no exception. There are too many problems, there is too much
poverty, and the governments have been thoroughly clumsy in the search for
solutions. Our countries are within the grasp of any populist, leftist
adventurer who will promise people the moon.
They're
waiting for it.
August 7, 2007
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